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Wednesday, February 20, 1963 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 
Senator Douglas Releases St.a.tement on the Conae1uences 
of the Breakdown in Negotiations between the United 
K~dom and the Common Ma.rket Coi.11.l"tries 
Sena.tor Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill.), Chairman of the Joint Economic 
Committee, today released a letter from the Honorable George W. Ball, 
Undersecretary of State. The letter provides a statement of the 
Administration's appraisal of the iml)lications for the foreign economic 
policy of the United States of the breakdown in negotiations between the 
United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, or the Common Market. 
Jo:tnt E0onomic 
The letter was sent in response to a/Commitcee resolution, presented 
in the form of a quest:i.on l)Oaed by Senator Jacob K. J"a.v:t.ts (R~, N.Y.), to 
the Honorable C., Doug:!.a.s Dillon, Secretary of the Treaaur.f, du.ring his 
testimony before· the Jr.>int Economic Committee on Ja.."lua.:-y 31, 1963. The 
question read a.s follows: 11Mr. Secretary: In view of the changed situation 
caused by the E~EoC, 1s rejection of the British application for membership, 
what is the Administra.tion1s policy as it affects the Trade Ex:pansion Act 
of 1962 and other as:pects of our relationship with the E.E.c., the United 
Kimgdom, the B:ritish Commo:l'wealth, and the Euro:pea.n Free Trade Association?" 
In releasing the le·cter Sena.tor Douglas said, "This letter ordinarily 
would be made available to the public in the Committee 1s printed record of 
its recent hearings on the Presidentts Economic Report. The statement deals 
with a topic so vi ta.l to the economi.c and military strength of the free 
world that a se:pa.rate release is desirable in order to bring the matter 
to the attention of the Congress and the .American people without further 
delayo 11 
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Dear Sena.tor Douglas: 
THE UNDER SECBETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 
February 15, 1963 
Secret,ary Dillon has called my attention to the transcript of 
his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on January 31. 
In the course of his colloquy with the Commtttee several members 
expressed an interest in the Administration's appraieal of the 
implications for the United States foreign economic :policy of the 
breakdown in negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC. 
The significance of this event can best be appraised in re-
lation to other trends and events involved in the evolution of 
United States :policy toward Europe. 
I 
It is generally recognized that the progress of Europe toward 
unity has been emong the most constructive and promising achieve-
ments of the :post-war :periodo Through the creation and de,relopment 
of the European Economic Community, El.trope baa moved a long way 
toward economic integration. ~"hat goal, however, is far from 
fUll attainment and many difficult problems remain, 
The United States has consistently encouraged the nations of 
Europe toward greater unity. Both the Legislative and Executive 
Branch of our Government have provided this encouragement--by 
word and by action. We regard grQ.ter Eur1>pean unity as essential 
primarily for :political reasons--although, over the long run, the 
United States should also benefit econo:ad.cally from the contribution 
of the Common Market to a higher level of Euro:pea.n economic acvitity. 
A United Europe would eliminate the frictions and jealousies 
that have been the cause of so many pa.et conflicts--conflicts 
that on two occasions have embroiled the whole world in 
catastro~he. Moreover, a unified Europe could effectively mobilize 
the common strength of the European people. It should thus be 
able to play the role of equal :partner with the United States, 
carrying its full share of the cOlllmOn responsibilities im:posed by 
history on the economically-advanced peoples of the Free World. 
II 
The basis for such a :pa:ctnership is hard economic fact. In 
the North Atlantic World--W~stGn1 Europe and North America--there 
is concentrated 9~ of all Free World Industrial strength as well 
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bS the great bulk of the Free Wo~ld•s technical skill and knowledge. 
This combined resource must be put to the defense and advancement 
of the Free World. 
Combined action is :particularly important in thr~e areas: 
First, Europe and North America must join in a. common defense 
against the aggressive ambitions of the Comr:iunist Bloc. The 
defense of Europe is vital to the United States as well as to 
Europe itself. It is a costly task; the growth of European 
strength permits Europe to make an increasing contribution to it. 
Second, the national economies of the nations comprising the 
great industriel complex of the North Atlantic are interdependent. 
This is becoming mcreasir.gly evident o A slow .. do\.'tl in growth rates 
in Etlro:pe could adversely affect o·ar own growth rate, while an 
.American recession would have serious repercussion in Europe. 
our balance of :payments deficit is, to a large extent, the mirror 
image of balance of payments surpluses of certain major European 
countries. If one nation or area adopts restrictive commercial 
policies, those policies will find reflection in co?QP8nsatory or 
retaliatory actions by its trading :partners. 
The recognition of this economic inter~pendence has led us 
to seek new means to coordinate and harmonize our domestic 
economic policies , Substantial progress toward this end has been 
achieved through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Developnent. Much further progress is required. 
Third, the major industrialized areas of the Free World-•the 
Atlantic nations--must commit large amounts of money, equipnent 
and skill to assist the less-developed countries in raising their 
standards of living, if politi.cal stability is to be achieved and 
the de.ngers of subversion reduced. The effective utilization of 
Free World resources for this purpose requires a high degree of 
coordine.tion of effort. We are beginning to achieve that 
coordination through the Developnent Assistance Committee of the OECD. 
Fourth, if the resources of the Free World are to be efficiently 
utilized obstacles to the free flow of international trade must be 
reduced and trade expanded under conditions where the forces of 
comparative advantage can fully operate. This means that American 
goods must ha.ve greater access to the Ellropean markets while we 
must provide greater access for European goods to our own markets. 
Just as in other fields, benefits and obligations must be 
reciprocal. III 
During the :past few years United States Policy has been 
increasingly based on the belief that these common tasks could best 
be achieved by the pursuit of two parallel lines of a.ction--the 
attainment by Europe of a greater unity so that the European nations 
may act on a. widening subject matter through common institutions 
and the attainment of a. high degree of Atlantic cooperation through 
institutional arrangements designed for that purpose. 
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We have also felt that the effectiveness of our European 
:partner would be greatly enhanced if a. unified Europe were ex.:panded 
to inr.lude the United Kingdom. We were, therefore, gratified 
when the United Kingdom Government decided to apply for membership 
in the Euro:pean Economic Communtt.y. We recognized a.t that time, as 
we do now, that the organization of Eill'Ope was a problem for the 
Europeans, and that it involved grave national decisicns for the 
:pa.rtici:pating nations. We have not, therefore, sought to influence 
these decisions bu"t at the same time .. •8ince we have been re-
peatedly asked by our Euro:pean friends--we have been frank in 
stating that, in our view, the accession of the United Kingdom to 
the Rome Treaty would contribute tc the economic strength and 
J)Olitical cohesion of Euro:pe and thus advance the prospects for a 
full and effective Atlantic Partnership. 
During the course of the negotiations for the accession of 
Great Britain to the EEC--the United States Goverrnnant was 
repeatedly assured by the Six, including the French Government--
that none of the :parties had any :POlitical objection to United 
Kingdom membership in the EEC. We recognized, at the same time 
that the negotiations involved com:plex technical and economic 
problems--and there was always the :possibility that these problems 
might not be solved to the sa·liisfaction of all parties. We .• 
therefore, recognized t!ie JlOSSibility--although not the probability--
that these negotiations -would break down. 
The veto of the French Government terminating the negotiations 
occurred at a time when the technical and economic problems were 
well on their way to solution. This has been made clear by the 
statements issued by the Commission of the E'~ropean Economic 
Community. In our opinion, the action of the French Government 
must be regarded as motivated primarily by political reasons. 
It is still too early to know with precision what the French 
Government I s veto may imply for future French J)Olicy. It seems 
clear enough, however, that this action he.a not changed the 
underlying fa.cts that have dictated the need for greater European 
unity or effective Atlantic cooperation. We believe, also, 
that these facts are generally understood by the great body of 
European opinion. 
They can be briefly summarized: 
l. Euro:Pe cannot defend itself today by its own efforts; 
its defense rests heavily UJ;)On the overwhelming nuclear strength 
of the United States. 
2. The nuclear defense of the Free World is indivisible. 
3. The great industrial economies of the Nort.,b Atlantic 
countries are to a high degree interdependent. 
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4. To reap the full economic benefits of this interdel)endence 
requires a free flow of trade. 
5. The u.rg,m·I; m:ieds of the newly develc:ped na.M.ons require 
effective cOllllllOn effort on the :part of the major industrialized 
powers of the Free World. 
The existence of thE::se facts, it seems to us, determines the 
broad policy lines that we intend to pursue. 
First, we shall continue to enooura.ge the developnent of 
European wiity and to express the ho:Pe that arrangements ma.y 
ultimately be ma.de for the accession of Great Britain to full 
membershij? in the EEC. Recent events have demonstrated a sub-
stantial body of Europe.~n opinion in favor of Britain's :pa.rtici-
:pa.tion in a uniting Europe and the British Government has made 
known its own desire that the United Kingdom should play a. full 
role in this developnent. 
But while we continue to regard the ultimate accession of 
Great Britain to the Rome Treaty o.s an objective to be encouraged, 
we recognize that it is w:llikely to occur for some time. Meanwhile 
recent events do not ap:pear to have destroyed the vitality of the strong 
European drive toward untty nor seriously :lm:pa.ired the value of the 
integration so far achieYed through the EEC. Obviously, it is in 
the interests of the whole Free World that the EEC develop in an 
outward-looking ma..i.!ner and that it not acquire autarchic 
characteristics .. We propose to uae our influence to this end. 
Second, we shall seek to advance the arrangements for close 
economic cooperation with Europe through the OECD. We she.11 
also continue to develop close cooperation in the monetary field 
through the lMF, the Committee of Ten, and Working Party Three 
of' the OECD. 
Third, we shall continue to work toward the strengthening of 
NATO and the developnent of adequate conventional forces in Europe. 
We see dangers in the proliferation of national nuclear deterrents 
but we recognize the desire: of Europeans to play a tull role in 
their own nuclear defense. We ba.ve, therefore, proposed the 
creation of a multilateral nuclear force, within NA'IO, and we reached 
agreement with the Britiah Government at Nassau for the mutual 
support of such a force. Ambassador Livingston Merche.nt is going to 
Europe next week for exploratory discussions. 
Fourth, we intend to utilize to the fttllest the powers 
granted to the President wider the Trade Ex:pa.nsion Act in order 
to improve access to the Eu.ropean Common Market as well as other 
major world markets for p;roducts of United States fa1,ns and 
factories. Governor Herter intends to press liberalization of 
trade as rapidly as possible. 
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Since General de Gaulle t s press conference on January 14, 
suggestions have been :PUt forward for the United States to join in 
special commerc:i.a.l relations with one or another group of nations to 
form a trading bloc competitive with the European Common Market. 
We do not believe that this would be seiund J;lulicy. For thirty 
yea.rs, the United States has consisten·tly adhered to the most-
favored-nation principle and to the expansion of trade on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. For us to enter into preferential 
trading relations with 8..."'l.Y nation or nations would mean discrimin-
ation against all other nations. Such a. policy would be inconsistent 
with our position as the leader of the Free World. 
You and Congressman Reuse have raised the question of the 
adequacy of the powers provided by the Trade Ex:pa.nsion Act if it 
should develop that the UK does not become a member of the EEC prior 
to the opening of the Kennedy round of negotiations. You have 
introduced legislation that would so amend the Act that the scope 
of the so-called "predominant supplier" clause would be unaffected 
by the failure of the UK-EEC megotiations. The Administration's 
position with res:pect to th:i.s pro:posed legislation was stated by 
the President at his press conference of February 7 'When he said: 
"No, we ha"len't planned to ask the Congress, because we do 
have the power, under the T:ra.de E:lq)ansion bill, to reduce all 
other tariffs by 50 per cent, which is a substantial 
authority. We la.ck the zero authority. 
"On the other hand, it is going to take some months before 
these negotiations move ahead. It is :possible there may be 
some reconsideration of the British application. I would be 
responsive and in favor of legislation of the kind that you 
described. It io not aesentisl, but it would be available, and 
if the Uongress shows any dispositions to f'a.vor it, I would 
support it. 11 
Fifth, we propose to continue to develop techniques to improve 
the cooperation of the major industrialized IJOWers in providing 
assistance to the less-developed countries. This does not mean the 
abandonment of national programs of assists.nee but rather their 
more effective coordination. At the same time, we shall try to 
assure a greater contribution to this common effort on the part of 
the European countries. 
The broad lines I have described suggest the general directions 
of our policy. These policy goa.113 ba;ve been and will continue to be 
pursued through a variety of instrument.alities and in a variety of 
forms • The "teto of British accession to the EEC is not a.n 
insuperable obstacle to those policies. In 1954, the French 
Assembly turned down the European Defense Community Treaty, but 
the next few years were years of unprecedented progress towards 
European integration a.long other lines, The basic soundness of 
US policy was not affected. 
• 4 
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So today we have sought to chart a course that corresponds to 
the requirements of United States interest--to pursue a positive 
line of policy rather than merely to react to, or to follow, the 
policies of other Govermnents. This seems to us the only ];)Osture 
befitting the leading nation of the Free World. 
Sincerely yours, 
/s/ George W. Ball 
George W. Ball 
